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CORPORATE LAW:

OHIO'S NEWEST CLAIM OUTSIDE OF AN
APPRAISAL FOR DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS IN A MERGER SITUATION-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DuTY-Stepak v. Schey, 51

Ohio St. 3d 8, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (1990).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Appraisal statutes provide shareholders with a right to have the
value of their shares judicially determined and to be paid that amount
in cash.' These statutes have been described as providing the only appropriate remedy for shareholders who are dissatisfied with the price
agreed upon in a merger or acquisition.' Such a limitation on possible
remedies has been justified by the Ohio Supreme Court because it
reduces the "harassment potential" of "vexatious lawsuits" by preventing dissenting shareholders from bringing non-appraisal actions which
in reality are attempts to receive more money for their stock.' Despite
these reasons, courts have allowed remedies which do not arise from
the appraisal statutes." For example, Ohio courts have traditionally recognized that illegal, fraudulent, or ultra vires5 transactions are actiona-

1. R. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS § 17.9.2 (1989).
2. See generally Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 1198, 729 P.2d 683, 233 Cal. Rptr.
249 (1986) (discussing statutory remedies); Walter J. Schloss Assocs. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.,
73 Md. App. 727, 536 A.2d 147 (1988) (discussing statutory remedies); Note, Corporate law; In
a merger situation where a shareholder was aware of all facts which constituted the basis of the
claim of corporatefiduciary misconduct, an appraisalproceeding was the shareholder'sexclusive
remedy: Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1048, 1048-54 (1987).

3. Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 409, 513 N.E.2d 776, 788 (1987).
4. See Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 574 (11 th Cir. 1988) (directors'
decisions are not protected where there is a showing of either fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion); Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 187 (3rd Cir. 1988) (appraisal coexists
with common law causes of action and appraisal is not enacted to provide a shield for such conduct); Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973-75 (8th Cir. 1983) (a fiduciary duty is
independent of statute and may be enforced in an action other than appraisal); Ohio Drill & Tool
Co. v. Johnson, 625 F.2d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 1980) (action arises if director places himself in a
position of conflicting loyalty); Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186, 192 (6th Cir.
1974) (it does not matter if corporation suffered no loss, if the directors breached their duty and
profited from it); Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1954) (appraisal is not
exclusive where constructive fraud can be shown); Radol v. Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 586, 593 (S.D.
Ohio 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903

(1986) (appraisal is not exclusive where defendants occupy a fiduciary relationship); Coggins v.
New England Patriots Football Club, 397 Mass. 525, 533, 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1117-18 (1986)
(appraisal is not exclusive where violations of fiduciary duties are found).
5. Ultra vires acts are those actions taken by the corporation that are beyond the purposes
or powers of the corporation. W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 136 (4th ed. 1990).
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ble by shareholders outside of the appraisal statute.6 Additionally, at
least two non-Ohio courts allow for breach of fiduciary duty actions
where the directors have failed to obtain the best obtainable price in
7
merger and acquisition situations.
Prior to Stepak v. Schey,8 Ohio courts had not specifically held
that an action for breach of fiduciary duty could be maintained outside
of Ohio's appraisal statute. This note analyzes the status of an action
for breach of fiduciary duty outside the statutorily prescribed right of
appraisal following the Ohio Supreme Court's Stepak decision. 9 The
first section of this note reviews the basic fiduciary duties a director
owes to a corporation. Application of the appraisal statutes and the
recognized exceptions also are discussed. Next, this note traces the application of the rule of best obtainable price. Following that discussion,
this note analyzes the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in
Stepak and the Ohio Supreme Court's apparent reluctance to allow an
additional action in all but a few cases.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In Stepak v. Schey1 ° Barnett Stepak brought an action personally
as a shareholder and on behalf of the common shareholders of the
Scott & Fetzer Company." The defendants were Scott & Fetzer, some
of its officers and Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., Scott & Fetzer's new sole
shareholder." Stepak alleged that Scott & Fetzer granted Berkshire a
lock-up option 3 to acquire Scott & Fetzer common shares 4 at a speci-

6. See, e.g., Radol, 556 F. Supp. at 594 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Ohio's appraisal statute, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85 (Anderson Supp. 1990), has been interpreted by Ohio courts as providing an exclusive remedy, unless the transaction was illegal, fraudulent, or ultra vires. See Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 578, 15 N.E.2d 127, 132 (1938) (in dismissing the case the
court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to allege fraud or illegality); Vulcan Corp. v. Westheimer
& Co., 14 Ohio Op. 274, 276, 34 N.E.2d 278, 280 (1938), appeal dismissed, 135 Ohio St. 136, 19
N.E.2d 901 (1939) (the relief provided in the appraisal statute is exclusive to a minority shareholder in the absence of fraud or illegality); Williams v. National Pump Co., 46 Ohio App. 427,
432, 188 N.E. 756, 758, appeal dismissed, 126 Ohio St. 457, 186 N.E. 403 (1933) (the appraisal
statute "provide[s] a remedy for the objecting stockholders, and we are of the opinion that the
remedy so provided is exclusive").
7. Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
8. 51 Ohio St. 3d 8, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (1990).
9. Id.
10. 51 Ohio St. 3d 8, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (1990).
11. Id. at 9, 553 N.E.2d at 1073.
12. Id.
13. A lock-up option is an option or right granted to a takeover party to purchase additional.
shares of the target's stock at specified prices. R. HAMILTON, supra note 1, § 17.12.2.
14. Common shares are the proprietary units of ownership in a corporation and represent
the residual ownership interest in the corporation. R. HAMILTON, supra note 1, § 15.2.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/8
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fled price as a part of the merger agreement between the two entities. 16
The plaintiff alleged that the lock-up option was illegal because no consideration was given, and it was intended to thwart attempts of other
potential bidders to purchase Scott & Fetzer common shares at a price
higher than that offered by Berkshire."' Stepak did not identify any
alternative bidders who offered or could have offered a price higher
than the $60.45 per share price offered by Berkshire.1"
Stepak further alleged that $30 million in benefits were paid to
Scott & Fetzer executives as a result of the merger agreement."6 Prior
to their vote to approve the merger, the shareholders were informed of
the benefits in the form of contingent compensation, stock options, and
severance agreements that would accrue to the directors and officers of
Scott & Fetzer as a result of the merger.' 9 The contingent compensation contracts had been in effect prior to the merger." They provided
that certain corporate officers would receive compensation based on the
difference between the market price at the time the contracts were entered into and the price received by shareholders in the sale of the company. " Stepak contended that if the defendants had not engaged in
unfair dealing and manipulation the $30 million in benefits would have
been conferred upon the shareholders of Scott & Fetzer as additional
consideration resulting from the merger. 2
Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the structuring of the merger
constituted a breach of the defendants' fiduciary duties to the Scott &
Fetzer shareholders.2 3 Stepak concluded that as a result of the alleged
actions, he and the other common shareholders of Scott & Fetzer had
been and would be damaged because they had not and would not receive "their fair proportion of the value of the [company's] assets and
business. 12 4 He also stated that he and the other shareholders had been
and would be prevented from obtaining a fair market price for their
common stock. 5
At trial, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on
the grounds that they were barred by Ohio Revised Code section

15. Stepak, 51 Ohio St.
16. Id. at syllabus.
17. Appellants' Opening
(1990) (No. 88-1940).
18. Stepak, 51 Ohio St.
19. Appellants' Opening
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Stepak, 51 Ohio St.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.

3d at 9, 553 N.E.2d at 1073.
Brief at 6, Stepak v. Schey, 51 Ohio St. 3d 8, 553 N.E.2d 1072
3d at 9, 553 N.E.2d at 1073.
Brief at 9, Stepak (No. 88-1940).

3d at 9, 553 N.E.2d at 1073.
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1701.85,26 Ohio's appraisal statute. 7 The defendants further alleged
that the plaintiff's claims were derivative in nature and therefore belonged to the corporation and could not be pursued by one who was'no
longer a shareholder." In an unwritten decision, the trial court granted
the defendants' motion. The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County
reversed and held that the plaintiff's complaint was not barred by the
decision in Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co.,30 because it "was not a
direct challenge to determination of the fair value of the stock."'" The
court of appeals stated that Stepak made allegations that, to the financial detriment of the shareholders, the directors had engaged in unfair
dealing by granting an illegal lock-up option which prevented competitive bidding and that they had engaged in self-dealing by the illegal
payment of substantial benefits to the officers and directors. 2 Finally,
the court concluded that the plaintiff's claims were "tantamount to
fraud" and that he could maintain a personal action, exclusive of a
derivative claim, because he was injured personally when "his shares
were bought out pursuant to the merger." 3 3 The court of appeals certi34
fied the record of the case to the Ohio Supreme Court for review.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' decision and reinstated the dismissal of the case by the trial court.35 The majority
opinion stated that "an action for breach of fiduciary duty may be
maintained notwithstanding R.C. 1701.85 [the appraisal statute]; however, such- action may not seek to overturn or modify the fair cash
value determined in a cash-out merger." 6 The majority concluded that
the plaintiff was essentially challenging the sufficiency of the value paid
for his shares in the cash-out merger and was thus merely asking for
more money.3 7 Therefore, based on the supreme court's prior holding in

26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
27. Stepak, 51 Ohio St. 3d at 9, 553 N.E.2d at 1073.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 513 N.E.2d 776 (1987). In Armstrong, the Ohio Supreme Court
stated that provable injury under any type of action is "compensable so long as it does not seek to
modify the fair cash value determined" and that such an action is to be maintained outside an
appraisal proceeding. Id. at 422, 513 N.E.2d at 798.
31. Stepak, 51 Ohio St. 3d at 9, 553 N.E.2d at 1073-74.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 9, 553 N.E.2d at 1074.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 11, 553 N.E.2d at 1075.
36. Id. at 10, 553 N.E.2d 1074. A cash out merger has been defined as a transaction where
some shareholders are compelled to accept cash or property for their shares while other shareholders retain or receive equity interests in the continuing business. R. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at
542.
37. Stepak, 51 Ohio St. 3d at 11, 553 N.E.2d at 1075.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/8
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Armstrong, appraisal was his only remedy.3 8 The concurring opinion
spelled out what must be proven to maintain an action for breach of
fiduciary duty and declared that Ohio does not follow the rule laid out
in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.3 9 Revlon' established that directors have a duty to obtain the highest possible price
for the corporation's stock."1 The dissenting opinion argued that the
plaintiff had not merely asked for more money.42 It stated that the majority effectively "leave[s] shareholders without a remedy where management, in breach of its fiduciary duty, eliminates" potential higher
bidders. 4'3 The dissenting opinion called for the Ohio Supreme Court to
adopt the rule laid out in Revlon." To properly address the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Stepak v. Schey, the scope of directors' fiduciary duties, the appraisal statute and its applications, and the duty to
obtain the best obtainable price must be examined.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

Fiduciary Duties

1. Generally
It is a long established principle in Ohio that directors of a corporation have a fiduciary obligation to the corporation and are held liable
to shareholders or the corporation if corporate funds or property are
wasted or mismanaged due to their inattention to these fiduciary duties. 5 There are two separate duties which constitute the obligation of
directors: care and loyalty.41
2.

Duty of Care - The Business Judgement Rule

Ohio has codified the duty of care in Ohio Revised Code section
1701.59(B). 7 Section 1701.59 requires that a director perform his duties "with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would use under similar circumstances.' 8 The statute requires that it

38. Id.
39. Id. at 14, 553 N.E.2d at 1078.
40. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
41. Stepak, 51 Ohio St. 3d at 14, 553 N.E.2d at 1078.
42. Id. at 15-17, 553 N.E.2d at 1079-80 (Brown, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 15-16, 553 N.E.2d at 1079 (Brown, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 16-17, 553 N.E.2d at 1079 (Brown, J.,dissenting).
45. Stepak v. Schey, 51 Ohio St. 3d 8, 11-12, 553 N.E.2d 1072, 1076 (1990); accord Radol
v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 256 (6th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); see also Ohio
Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 625 F.2d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 1980); Nienaber v. Katz, 69 Ohio App.
153, 43 N.E.2d 322 (1942).
46. See cases cited supra note 45.
47. OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 1701.59(B) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
Published48.by Id.
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be proven that the director violated his duty of care "by clear and convincing evidence." 4' 9 The Sixth Circuit has said that "in evaluating a
director's compliance with the duty of care, Ohio courts adhere to the
business judgment rule."5 This is the standard under which courts
have reviewed corporate decision-making.5 1
The business judgement rule declares that a court will not inquire
into the wisdom of actions taken by disinterested directors in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion. 2 One commentator
has said that a presumption arises "that disinterested directors have
met all the required standards of conduct" where the business judgment rule is applicable.5 3 This judicial deference to the business decision-making of directors may be justified by the belief that corporate
directors must have "sufficient discretion to develop business strategies
that may enhance the company's effectiveness and profitability."5 4 Judicial inquiry into business decision-making would discourage the pursuit of business strategies because while such strategies will inevitably
involve some risk, it is a risk that the company must be willing to ac55
cept if it is to grow and prosper.
3. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty has been codified in Ohio Revised Code section
1701.59(B)." This statute requires that the director perform his duties
in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of the corporation.5 7 There is a long estab-

49. Id. § 1701.59(C).
50. Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 256 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986);
see also Gruber v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 158 F. Supp. 593, 603 (N.D. Ohio 1957); Apicella v.
PAF'Corp., 17 Ohio App. 3d 245, 247, 479 N.E.2d 315, 318 (1984); Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Struble, 82 Ohio App. 480, 485, 81 N.E.2d 622, 625, appeal dismissed, 150 Ohio St. 409, 82
N.E.2d 856 (1948).
51. Note, Corporate Auctions and Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third Generation Business Judgement Rule, 87 MicH. L. REV. 276, 280 (1988).
52. See generally Walter, The Directors' Business Judgement Rule - The Final Act?, 22
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 649, 650-51 (1988).
53. Note, supra note 51, at 281.
54. Id.
55. Id. One commentator has noted that "[i]n the context of merger, takeover, and shareholder's derivative action . . .[several] cases have affirmed . . . a more onerous standard of care
on the director," and this trend toward a stricter test for such transactions has been predicted to
continue indefinitely. Walter, supra note 52, at 685-86.
56. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(B) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
57. Id.
[A] director, in determining what he believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,
shall consider the interests of the corporation's shareholders and, in his discretion, may
consider any of the following:
(1)The interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors, and customers;
(2)The economy of the state and the nation;

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/8
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lished principle in the common law that directors owe a fiduciary duty
to the corporation and that "good faith and full disclosure to shareholders do not insulate a: director from liability if he has placed himself in a
position of conflicting loyalties to the corporation and his own private
interest."" Since directors owe a duty of loyalty to the corporation,
they are not entitled to the protection of the business judgement rule
when they are personally interested in a corporate control transaction
which is the subject of their business judgment.5 9 A director is "interested" in the transaction when the outcome of the transaction would
directly and materially affect his position with the company or his personal financial interests. 60 The Second and Sixth Circuits, and at least
one commentator, have stated that "[o]nce a prima facie showing is
made that directors have a self-interest in a particular corporate transaction, the burden shifts to them to demonstrate that the transaction is
fair and serves the best interests of the corporation and the shareholders." 6' 1 The Sixth Circuit has also stated that the directors' burden of
showing that a transaction is fair and in the best interests of shareholders is dependent upon the plaintiff "showing that the directors have
acted in bad faith or without the requisite objectivity."6 2 Consequently,
before the directors need to defend their actions, the plaintiff must
show either that the directors had a self-interest in the transaction or
had acted in bad faith or without objectivity.
B.

The Appraisal Statute

1. Reason for the Remedy
Appraisal statutes were enacted in reaction to changes in corporate structure which the common law could not accomodate. The common law required that fundamental corporate changes could occur only
after the shareholders had unanimously consented.6 3 In today's society,
allowing a single shareholder to prevent needed changes in a corpora(3)Community and societal considerations.
(4)The long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders, including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
Id. § 1701.59(E).
58. Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 257 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986);
see also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2nd Cir. 1984); Ohio Drill &
Tool Co. v. Johnson, 625 F.2d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 1980); Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389,
397 (6th Cir. 1954).
59. Radol, 772 F.2d at 257; see also Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264.
60. Radol, 772 F.2d at 257.
61. Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264; see also Radol, 772 F.2d at 257; Note, supra note 51, at 30001.
62. Radol, 772 F.2d at 257.
63. See Griesse v. Lang,
Published by eCommons, 1990 37 Ohio App. 553, 555-56, 175 N.E. 222, 224 (1931).
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tion would make the corporate form unworkable because it would be
nearly impossible for all the shareholders of a large corporation to
agree on any particular action. 4 In fact, "all states have provided by
statute that unanimity is no longer a requisite to approval by the shareholders of such fundamental changes in the corporate structure as
merger or sale of assets." 5 In accordance with this response, Ohio enacted the appraisal statute, General Code 8628-72, which was subsequently renamed and amended as section 1701.85 of the Ohio Revised
Code.6 6 The appraisal statute provides dissenting shareholders the right
to be paid the fair cash value of their shares."7 Consequently, while the
majority shareholders may approve fundamental changes, the dissenting shareholders are compensated for the dilution of their rights
through the allowance of an appraisal action.6 8
2.

Application of the Appraisal Statute

As noted in the preceding paragraph, the right to an appraisal in
Ohio is governed by section 1701.85 of the Ohio Revised Code.6 9 The
shareholder or corporation must properly bring the issue before the
common pleas court."0 The court will then determine whether the
shareholder is entitled to the fair cash value of his shares, and the court
may appoint an appraiser to collect evidence and "recommend a decision on the amount of the fair cash value."'7 1 Fair cash value is to be
determined "as of the day prior to that on which the vote by the shareholders was taken . . . [and] is the amount which a willing seller,
under no compulsion to sell, would be willing to accept, and which a
willing buyer, under no compulsion to purchase, would be willing to

64. See Id.
65. Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 402-03, 513 N.E.2d 776, 782
(1987).
66. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
67. Id. For a discussion of current types of appraisal statutes see Kanda & Levmore, The
Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REv. 429, 445-463 (1985).
68. See generally Opdyke v. Security Savings & Loan, 99 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio App. 1951),
affd, 157 Ohio St. 121, 105 N.E.2d 9 (1952) (state savings and loan shareholders entitled to
appraisal where corporation changes form to a federal savings and loan).
69. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85 (Anderson Supp. 1990). The vote as to a proposed
transaction must have taken place and the result must be known, and the shareholder's share(s)
must not have voted in favor of the proposal. Id. § 1701.85(A)(2). "[T]he shareholder shall deliver to the corporation a written demand for payment to him of the fair cash value of the shares
as to which he seeks relief, stating . . . the amount claimed by him as the fair cash value of his
shares." Id. If the shareholder and the corporation cannot agree on the fair cash value of the
share(s), either the shareholder or the corporation may file an action which may be joined by
other dissenting shareholders. Id. § 1701.85(B).
70. Id.
71. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/8
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pay."7 2 Any appreciation or depreciation resulting from the merger,
consolidation, or 'acquisition must be excluded from the determination
of the fair cash value of the stock. 73 Since the statute states that such
effects will be excluded, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
valuation remedy clearly is a remedy that does not give dissenting
shareholders any element of value attributable to the transaction from
74
which they have dissented.
3.

Exceptions to an Appraisal

Although appraisal statutes are intended to satisfy the rights of
dissenting shareholders, some courts have interpreted the relevant statute as allowing for some exceptions to the remedy." 5 As to the exclusiveness of appraisal as a remedy, one commentator has stated that
there are four types of state statutory provisions: non-exclusive, exclusive, presumptive, and silent statutes. 7" In- nineteen state statutes the
appraisal remedy is non-exclusive for actions alleging fraud or illegality. 77 The appraisal remedy is made exclusive in only three state statutes.78 If the plaintiff fails to exercise the statutory appraisal right, the
third type of statute, the presumptive statute, provides that the shareholder: (1) shall be bound by the corporate action; (2) is bound by the
corporate action; or (3) is conclusively presumed to have acquiesced in
the corporate action.7 9
Lastly, six states have enacted silent appraisal statutes which do
not mention whether the appraisal remedy is exclusive.80 Ohio is one of
these six states.8 1 Where the appraisal statute is silent as to its exclu72. Id. at § 1701.85(C).
73. Id.
74. Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 410, 513 N.E.2d 776, 788 (1987).
75. See cases cited supra note 4.
76. Dunn, Steinberg v. Amplica: The CaliforniaSupreme Court Holds Appraisal to be the
Dissenting Shareholder's Remedy, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 293, 306-07 (1988).
77. Id. at 307. These states are Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia. Id.
78. Id. at 310. These states are Pennsylvania, Connecticut and California. Id. For a thorough discussion of the California statute see Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 1198, 729 P.2d
683, 233 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1986). See also Note, supra note 1, at 1048-54.
79. Dunn, supra note 76, at 309-10.
States having a "shall be bound" statute are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. States having a "conclusively presumed" statute include Indiana, Louisiana, and Nevada ("deemed
to have assented"). The Maryland statute simply states that the shareholder "is bound."

Id. (footnotes omitted).
80. Id. at 308. These six states are Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Ohio, and
Oklahoma. Id.
81. Id.
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siveness, courts generally have allowed for remedies outside the appraisal statute.82 Shareholders may seek another remedy outside the
appraisal statute where transactions are illegal, fraudulent, or ultra
vires, or where there is constructive fraud or a conflict of interest by

the directors.8 3 For the first time, in Stepak v. Schey, the Ohio Supreme Court allowed an action for breach of fiduciary duty outside
Ohio's appraisal statute.14 The remaining five states which have enof
acted silent appraisal statutes have not yet addressed the availability
85
an action for breach of fiduciary duty outside their statutes.

While the Ohio Supreme Court, prior to Stepak v. Schey, had not
directly addressed the issue of whether an action for breach of fiduciary
duty can be maintained outside the appraisal statute, 86 several courts
in other states and the federal circuit had considered it.87 In Walter J.
Schloss Associates v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway,88 the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that
the Maryland appraisal statute does not limit them to payment of fair
value even after the merger is consummated.8 9 The Maryland court allowed the plaintiffs to sue in the alternative for rescissory or other damages where they alleged fraud, breach of fiduciary obligation, overreaching, or lack of fair dealing.9" The court, however, agreed with the
Delaware Supreme Court's Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 91 decision which

82. See cases cited supra note 4.
83. Id.
84. 51 Ohio St. 3d 8, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (1990).
85. Dunn, supra note 76, at 308.
86. 51 Ohio St. 3d 8, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (1990).
87. See generally Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Norlin Corp.
v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d
971 (8th Cir. 1983); Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 625 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1980); Seagrave
Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,'
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983); Walter
J. Schloss Assocs. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 73 Md. App. 727, 536 A.2d 147 (1988).
88. 73 Md. App. at 727, 536 A.2d at 153.
89. Id. at 738, 536 A.2d at 153. In Schloss, the merger of two subsidiaries of CSX Corporation was contested by the minority shareholders of one of the subsidiaries, the Baltimore and
Ohio Railway Company (B & 0), who claimed that the $113 per share price offered to them was
grossly inadequate. Id. at 733, 536 A.2d at 150. The directors of B & 0 subsequently approved
the plan of merger and the payment of $124 per share for the minority shareholders of B & 0
after these shareholders instituted an action with, among others, claims of breach of fiduciary duty
to the minority shareholders. Id. at 736, 536 A.2d at 151.
90. Id. at 738, 536 A.2d at 153.
91. 457 A.2d at 701 (Del. 1983). At issue in Weinberger was a proposal by a 50.5% parent
to purchase the remaining 49.5 % of the subsidiary. Id. at 705. The officials of the parent, who
were also directors of the subsidiary, had suggested in a report that a purchase of up to $24 per
share would be a good investment for the parent, but the parent decided to offer only $21 per
share. Id. at 707-08. The report was never shared with the minority shareholders, and the $21
price was approved. Id. at 708. The difference between the $21 per share and $24 per share
constituted over $17 million to the minority, shareholders. Id. at 709.
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indicated that the plaintiff must allege specific acts of misconduct to
demonstrate the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority. 92 The
Weinberger court concluded that the appraisal remedy is exclusive for
minority shareholders in a merger.9" It recognized, however, that the
appraisal "may not be adequate in certain cases, particularly where
fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate as'
sets, or gross and palpable overreaching are involved." 94
The Weinberger court did not explain why it found that these types, of cases
might be inadequately remedied by the appraisal statute. In discussing
the application of Weinberger in Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical
Corp.9 5 the Delaware Supreme Court articulated that "mere allegations of 'unfair dealing,' " with regard to a corporate merger, "without
more, cannot survive a motion to dismiss"; however, "averments containing 'specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or items of misconduct' " must be carefully examined. 96 The court in Schloss, taking into
account the decisions in Weinberger and Rabkin, found that the plaintiffs' averments were wholly inadequate because they were merely conclusory and were "essentially a complaint over price - the amount and
how it was established" for which appraisal was an adequate remedy. 97
Several courts have addressed the availability of an action for
breach of fiduciary duty outside the appraisal statute where there has
been a breach of the duty of loyalty.9 8 Some of these courts have stated
that a director is liable for breach of fiduciary duty even if the director
acted without actual fraudulent intent if the director placed himself in
a position of conflicting loyalties and subsequently violated his or her
primary obligation to the corporation.99 For example, in Seagrave

92. Schloss, 73 Md. App. at 743, 536 A.2d at 155; see also Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
93. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
94. Id.
95. 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985). In Rabkin; a class action was brought on behalf of the
minority shareholders of Hunt Chemical Corporation challenging the merger of Hunt with its
majority stockholder, Olin Corporation. Id. at 1100. When Olin bought 63.4% of the outstanding
stock, it promised to pay $25 per share if it acquired the remaining Hunt stock within one year
thereafter. Id. at 110.1. A year and twenty-six days later Olin offered to pay $20 per share.-Id. at
1102. The minority shareholders instituted an action claiming "that the price offered was grossly
inadequate because Olin unfairly manipulated the timing of the merger to avoid the one year
commitment." Id. at 1103.
96. Id. at 1105.
97. Walter J. Schloss Assocs. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R ., 73 Md. App. 727, 748, 536 A.2d
147, 158 (1988).
98. See Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986);
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v.
Johnson, 625 F.2d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 1980); Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th
Cir. 1954).
99. Ohio Drill, 625 F.2d at 742. See also Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186,
191-92 (6th Cir. 1974); Seagrave,.212 F.2d at 397; Nienaber v. Katz, 69 Ohio App. 153, 158, 43
Published by eCommons, 1990
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Corp. v. Mount,'0 0 because certain directors who had approved the
transaction stood to gain from the deal, the Sixth Circuit invoked the
equitable doctrine of constructive fraud. 10 ' Under this doctrine, acts
done in good faith may amount to constructive fraud even though the
director had no intent to harm the corporation, if the acts were done by
a director who had a conflict between his fiduciary obligations and his
own private interests. 0 2 A court may then take appropriate action to
prevent the harm resulting from such actions, regardless of the director's good intentions. 0 3
In Radol v. Thomas, 0 4 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
applying Ohio law, discussed the principle that a director owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and noted that "good faith and full disclosure to shareholders do not insulate a director from liability if he has
placed himself in a position of conflicting loyalties to the corporation
and his own private interest."' 15 In Radol, shareholders of Marathon
Oil Company brought an action claiming that the directors of Marathon had breached their fiduciary duty to the shareholders by structuring the merger of Marathon Steel and United States Steel in a manner
that preserved their control over Marathon. 10 6 The Radol court took
notice of the fact that Seagrave and Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson 1 7 "appl[ied] the rule that directors owe a duty of loyalty to the
corporation and are not entitled to the discretion permitted by the business judgment rule when they are interested in a corporate control
transaction which is the subject of their business judgment as directors."' 10 8 The Radol court, however, declined to accept the plaintiff's
allegations of breach of the duty of loyalty based on a mere assertion
"that [a] stock option agreement and employment assurance alone
placed the directors in a position of conflicting loyalties so that the burden of proof shifted to the defendants" to show that the transaction
was fair.' 0 9 The court stated the general rule that "directors carry the

100. 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954).
101. Id. at 397. In Seagrave, feuding directors sought to solidify their positions with the
company in the structuring of a purchase of stock of another corporation. Id. at 393. The Sixth
Circuit held that the personal interests of the controlling directors interfered with the unprejudiced judgment to which the plaintiffs were entitled. Id. at 397.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986).
105. Radol, 772 F.2d at 257.
106. Id. at 246.
107. 625 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1980).
108. Radol, 772 F.2d at 257; see also Ohio Drill, 625 F.2d at 742; Seagrave Corp. v.
Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 396 (6th Cir 1954).
109. Radol, 772 F.2d at 257.
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burden of showing that a transaction is fair and in the best interests of
shareholders only after the plaintiff has made a prima facie case showing that the directors have acted in bad faith or without requisite
objectivity."11
Finally, in Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co.,
the Ohio Supreme
Court discussed "whether the statutory proceeding under R.C. 1701.85
[Ohio's appraisal statute] is the exclusive means for the determination
of the price that shall be paid for those shares held by the dissenting
shareholders.""' 2 Armstrong was an action filed by dissenting shareholders of Marathon Petroleum Company challenging the merger between Marathon and a subsidiary of the United States Steel Corporation."' The shareholders sought the fair cash value of their stock
through an appraisal action and attempted to join other causes of action to the proceeding. 4 The secondary claims asserted that the directors and controlling shareholders of Marathon had breached their fiduciary duties through the initiation, timing, negotiation, structure, and
approval of the merger."' The Armstrong court determined that the
appraisal remedy was the exclusive means for determining the value of
the dissenters' shares."' The court concluded that the legislature in-'
tended section 1701.85(C) of the Ohio Revised Code to establish that
the market price of the stock is determinative of the fair cash value." 7
The court considered the additional claims involved in Armstrong to be
an attempt to include other factors in the determination." 8 Further,
the court noted: "[T]his is not to say that causes of action which seek
compensation other than the value of a dissenter's shares of stock are
not maintainable. Provable injury under whatever theory utilized is
compensable so long as it does not seek to overturn or modify the fair
cash value determined.""' 9
For the first time, in Stepak v. Schey, 2 0 the Ohio Supreme Court
decided that this language in Armstrong allowed for the maintenance
of an action for breach of fiduciary duty outside an appraisal proceeding. 2' This was in accord with the decisions in a growing number of
other courts.' 2 2

110. Id.; see also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984).
111. 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 513 N.E.2d 776 (1987).
112. Id. at 421-22, 513 N.E.2d at 798.
113. Id. at 398, 513 N.E.2d at 778.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 421, 513 N.E.2d at 797.
116. Id. at 421-22, 513 N.E.2d at 798.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 422, 513 N.E. 2d at 798.
51 Ohio St. 3d1990
8, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (1990).
Published120.
by eCommons,
121. Id. at 8, 553 N.E.2d at 1073.
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Obtaining the Best Possible Price

At least two courts have determined that in certain circumstances
directors have a duty to obtain the best possible price for the corpora2"
tion at its sale. 123 In Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
the Delaware Supreme Court required that any defensive takeover
measures attempted by directors be rationally related to shareholder
benefit. 2 5 Specifically, the Revlon court held that "the directors must
act as auctioneers whose primary responsibility is to realize the best
sale price for the benefit of the stockholders" when the sale or breakup
of a target corporation becomes inevitable.' 26 In Edelman v. Fruehauf.
Corp., 2 ' the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying Michigan law, interpreted Revlon as saying that "[w]hen, in violation of this
duty, directors take measures that are intended to put an end to the
bidding, those measures may be enjoined."' 2 8 The court allowed an injunction against a leveraged buyout 129 because the directors had not
acted in good faith to negotiate the best deal for the shareholders but
had acted as interested parties. 30 Prior to Stepak v. Schey,"3 I the Ohio
Supreme Court had not determined whether directors have such a duty
to obtain the highest possible price in a merger situation and thus
whether a shareholder may maintain an action for the breach of such a
duty.

122. See generally Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Norlin Corp.
v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d
971 (8th Cir. 1983); Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 625 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1980); Seagrave
Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983); Walter
J. Schloss Assocs. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 73 Md. App. 727, 536 A.2d 147 (1988).
123. See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
124. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
125. Id. at 182. Some examples of defensive takeover measures include super-majority provisions, board staggerings, poison pills, shark repellents, state anti-takeover statutes, crown jewels,
lock-up options, stock lockups, self tenders, greenmail payments, ESOPs, and white knights. For a
further discussion of these measures, see W. KLEIN & J.COFFEE, JR., supra note 5, at 169-72.
126. Note, supra note 51, at 276.
127. 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
128. Id. at 887.
129. A leveraged buyout is a transaction in which incumbent management of a corporation
purchases all publicly owned shares of the corporation and makes the corporation privately owned.
R. HAMILTON, supra note 1, § 17.16. Most of the purchase price is borrowed and is assumed by
the now private corporation. Id.
130. Id.
131. 51 Ohio St. 3d 8, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (1990).
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IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Introduction

In Stepak v. Schey, 1 2 the Ohio Supreme Court declared that an
action for breach of fiduciary duty may be maintained outside the appraisal statute, but the court imposed vague restrictions upon such an
action, making its application uncertain. In Armstrong v. Marathon
Oil, Co., 3' the court declared that the appraisal remedy was to be considered exclusive but indicated that it would allow actions such as
breach of fiduciary duty.134 The court stated that an action may be
maintained "under whatever theory utilized so long as it did not seek to
overturn or modify the fair cash value determined."' 3 5 The question
then becomes whether Stepak was actually seeking to "overturn or
modify the fair cash value."' 3 6 The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Stepak analyze the question in different fashions.
B.

The Majority Opinion

The majority in Stepak used the following language in Armstrong
as the basis for its holding: "[A]n action for breach of fiduciary duty
may be maintained notwithstanding R.C. 1701.85; however, such action may not seek to overturn or modify the fair cash value determined
in a cash-out merger."'3 7 The court's conclusion is consistent with several cases within the Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits and
one state court outside Ohio. 38 The majority then considered whether
an action for breach of fiduciary duty may be maintained when the
plaintiff is charging breach based on the defendants' failure to obtain
the highest possible price. 3 9 The majority viewed such a claim as essentially only a complaint over the price obtained for the shares.4 0
Consequently, the court found that the action was barred by Armstrong as an independent claim because the plaintiff was challenging
the value paid for his shares in the merger.14
The majority, however, gave little guidance to lower courts on
what a plaintiff must prove to maintain an action for breach of fiduciary duty action outside the appraisal statute. First, it seems that the
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

51 Ohio St. 3d 8, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (1990).
32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 513 N.E.2d 776 (1987).
Id. at 422, 513 N.E.2d at 798.
Id.
Id.
Stepak at 10, 553 N.E.2d at 1074.
See cases cited supra note 4.
Stepak, 51 Ohio St. 3d at 10-11, 553 N.E.2d at 1075.
Id. at 11, 553 N.E.2d at 1075.
Id.
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majority opinion attempted to fashion a narrow disposition of Stepak's
claim by focusing on his attempt to get "the highest obtainable
price. "14" This essentially forecloses any viable claim where the plaintiff
asserts a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors in designing a lockup option that prevents the targeted corporation from obtaining any
higher prices. If the breach of duty causes a decrease in the value that
would have been obtained by the shareholders had there been no
breach, the shareholder cannot complain if the value that is obtained is
a fair cash value or better. For example, if corporation A wanted to
acquire target corporation C for $20 per share and C's directors had
entered into a lock-up option with Corporation B at $10 per share, C's
shareholders could not maintain an action for breach of fiduciary duty
if the "fair value" of the shares was $10. They would be merely complaining about the price obtained. One commentator has argued that
"[s]tate fiduciary duty principles should be applied in a manner that
will encourage lock-ups designed to stimulate bidding and will discourage devices that tend to foreclose all bidders but the optionee."'' 3 Since
the transaction involved in Stepak was a lock-up option, any other potential bidders for Scott & Fetzer's shares were foreclosed from offering a higher price to the shareholders. If the directors are supposed to
act in the best interests of the corporation and its owners, the shareholders, the directors should be required to obtain the best price possible to increase the amount received by the shareholders. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, considered that compelling the directors to
obtain the highest possible price would unduly restrict the decisionmaking capacity of directors."' It may be in the best interests of the
shareholders that the directors have the ability to fend off a hostile
takeover with a defense such as a lock-up option. This would be true
where there is a hostile takeover attempt by an individual or a corporation whose interests or management skills are not in accord with the
shareholders' interests.
Second, the majority failed to address Stepak's allegations of selfdealing on the part of the defendants who received $30 million in benefits that should have been conferred upon the shareholders. The Court
of Appeals for Cuyahoga County noted that Stepak made a relevant
allegation of self-dealing. 14 5 The supreme court did not address this issue specifically. It is not clear whether the majority in the supreme
court found that this specific allegation was moot since all the allega-

142. Id.
143. Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1068,
1078-79 (1983).
144. Stepak, 51 Ohio St. 3d at 14, 553 N.E.2d at 1078 (Holmes, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 9, 553 N.E.2d at 1074.
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tions were based upon a complaint merely asking for more money. It is
possible that the court determined that the allegations were not supportable because benefits such as contingent compensation, stock options and severance agreements are very common in merger and acquisition situations, and have thus been impliedly consented to by
shareholders.14 6 Such benefits are frequently negotiated prior to a
merger or acquisition agreement for the purpose of reducing the anxiety of executives about their futures and for attracting competent management to the corporations. 4 7 Finally, the majority opinion did not
address the issue of whether Stepak could maintain a personal action as
14 a
was decided by the court of appeals.
The majority opinion implies that it will be a difficult task for a
shareholder to pursue an action for breach of fiduciary duty outside the
appraisal statute after the merger has occurred. Unless the plaintiff alleges that his or her shares were undervalued, he or she must be careful
to plead specifically as to the breach claimed." 9 He or she must attempt to seek a remedy that will not be interpreted as merely a complaint about price. The majority in Stepak failed to delineate which
claims challenge the value paid for shares.
C.

The Concurring Opinion

The concurring opinion in Stepak, like the majority, recognized a
right of action for breach of fiduciary duty outside the appraisal statute
but in doing so attempted to give a clearer road map for future litigants
than did the majority.6 0 The concurrence carefully pointed out the applicable fiduciary duties and the standards that a shareholder must

146. See Levine & Lykos, Practicing Lawyer Institute, No. 474, Hostile Battles for Corporate Control 127-36 (1985).
147. Id.
148. There is some question as to whether a former shareholder who has tendered his shares
in a merger transaction may maintain a derivative action or an action individually for breach of
fiduciary duty notwithstanding whether the action itself may be brought. A shareholder cannot
maintain an individual action for his own benefit against directors who, it is contended, have
committed acts damaging to the corporation, or through whose negligence the corporate assets
have been wasted and lost. See generally Zinn v. Baxter, 65 Ohio St. 341, 62 N.E. 327 (1901).
However, it would be possible for a present shareholder to maintain a derivative action if the
corporate management fails or refuses to enforce a corporate right, commits breaches of trust, is
guilty of fraudulent acts, whereby injury is done to the corporation's interests. Id. at 364-66, 62
N.E. at 330-31. It is important to note that this is predicated upon a present owner of shares. Id.
A person who has parted with his shares in the corporation cannot maintain the action. The action
can be maintained only by a shareholder while he still owns shares in the corporation. Id.; see also
OHIo R. Civ. P. 23.1.
149. Stepak, '51 Ohio St. 3d at 11, 553 N.E.2d at 1075.
150.byId.
at 12-14, 553
N.E.2d at 1076-77 (Holmes, J., concurring).
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overcome in a suit for breach of fiduciary duty. 151 The concurring opinion described the duties of care and loyalty that are enunciated in Ohio
Revised Code section 1701.59 and how these duties have been interpreted by Ohio courts and the Sixth Circuit. 52 Unlike the majority, the
concurring opinion stated explicitly that Ohio does not follow the rule
laid out in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 53 that
directors are held to a duty to obtain the highest possible price.1 54
The concurrence then stated that, while Stepak had sufficiently
stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, his action failed
because of his "untimeliness in asserting certain claims and his failure
to request the proper remedy as to other claims. 1' 55 The reasoning of
the concurrence may have been that the plaintiff had a variety of other
options which he apparently disregarded.1 56 These options would include: an action seeking disgorgement of any profits resulting from the
breach; an action to enjoin the merger prior to its consummation; an
action for rescission of the merger and/or appropriate damages with a
showing of unlawfulness, ultra vires acts, fraud, or nondisclosure; and
simply an action for breach of fiduciary duties brought prior to the
consummation of the merger.1 57 The concurrence noted that to allow a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty when there are other satisfactory
remedies "would result in defeating the statutory purpose and intent of
Ohio's corporate takeover and merger chapter."' 5
In Armstrong, the Ohio Supreme Court noted as a value of appraisal that reduction in costs is one of the purposes of the corporate
takeover and merger chapter.159 Costs avoided may include: (1) those

151. Id. The concurring opinion cited the following aforementioned statutes and cases in its
discussion of the subjects. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.59(B),(C),(D) (Anderson Supp.
1990); see also Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1988); Norlin
Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 625
F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1980); Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1974);
Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954); Radol v. Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 586, 593
(S.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
903 (1986); Gruber v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 158 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ohio 1957); Apicella v.
PAF Corp., 17 Ohio App. 3d 245, 247, 479 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1984); Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Struble, 82 Ohio App. 480, 485, 81 N.E.2d 622, 625 (1948); Nienaber v. Katz, 69 Ohio App. 153,
43 N.E.2d 322 (1942).
152. Stepak, 51 Ohio St. 3d at 12-15, 553 N.E.2d at 1076-78 (Holmes, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 14, 553 N.E.2d at 1078 (Holmes, J., concurring). (interpreting Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)).
154. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
155. Stepak, 51 Ohio St. 3d at 14-15, 553 N.E.2d at 1078 (Holmes, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 15, 553 N.E.2d at 1078-79 (Holmes, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 15, 553 N.E.2d at 1078 (Holmes, J.,concurring).
158. Id. at 15, 553 N.E.2d at 1079 (Holmes, J., concurring).
159. Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 409-10, 513 N.E.2d 776, 788
(1987).
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borne by the dissenting shareholders in litigation; (2) costs to the majority shareholders of the funds expended in the litigation; and (3) costs
incurred by the interruption of corporate reorganizations. 160 It seems
logical that a plaintiff such as Stepak need not be afforded a further
alternative claim when other sufficient avenues are available to him be-cause he would be exposing corporations and shareholders to unwarranted costs.
D.

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting opinion in Stepak declared that the majority ignored the allegations in the complaint and that the majority's rule
would leave present and future shareholder litigants without any remedy. 16 ' In the view of the dissenters, when shareholders are "deprived
of the best offer for their shares when self-dealing directors make a sale
at fair cash value or better," they are left without a remedy. 62 One
could argue that the majority is not ignoring the allegations but is looking to the true aspect of the claim. The majority found that the allegations were based on a mere attempt to receive more money for the
shares and thus must be brought in an appraisal proceeding. 6 ' The
dissent called for the adoption of the Revlon"" rule that "[t]he directors owe a duty to the shareholders to obtain the highest price for the
shares.' 6 5 The dissent's argument was predicated upon the belief that
the dissenting shareholders are entitled to receive the highest price obtainable, and that they are somehow entitled to receive a value over the
appraisal fair cash value.1 66 The dissent did not present any support
that this is the law in Ohio, and apparently wanted the court to create
an equitable remedy similar to that established in Revlon." 7 The dissent ignored the other remedies of the plaintiff which were described in
the concurrence. 6 8 The argument in the dissent is unfounded, because
it wishes to create a right to the highest obtainable price and chooses to
ignore other actions which do leave a shareholder with a remedy.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the majority opinion in Stepak v. Schey did not
instruct litigants in what they must plead and prove in a cause of ac160. Id.
161. Stepak, 51 Ohio St. 3d at 15-16, 553 N.E.2d at 1079 (Brown, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 16, 553 N.E.2d at 1080 (Brown, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 11, 553 N.E.2d at 1075.
164. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
165. Stepak, 51 Ohio St. 3d at 16, 553 N.E.2d at 1079-80 (Brown, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 16-17, 553 N.E.2d at 1080.
167. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
168. Stepak, 51 Ohio St. 3d at 15, 553 N.E.2d at 1078-79.
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tion for breach of fiduciary duty outside the appraisal statute. The majority opinion, however, did not sound the death knell for fiduciary duty
actions against directors brought outside the appraisal statute. The
court did recognize that such a claim exists, and that while the decision
may be limited to actions that do not seek to overturn or modify the
fair cash value determined, there are several other avenues that an aggrieved shareholder may pursue. As was described in the concurrence,
these other avenues would include: an action seeking disgorgement of
any profits resulting from the breach; an action to enjoin the merger
prior to its consummation; an action for rescission of the merger and/or
appropriate damages with a Showing of unlawfulness, ultra vires acts,
fraud, or nondisclosure; and simply an action for breach of fiduciary
duties brought prior to the consummation of the merger.
David L. Kinsella
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